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The Turbot War : 
Gunboat Diplomacy or Refinement 
of the Law of the Sea* ? 
Michael K E I V E R * * 
This article attempss an analysis of Canadian environmental diplo-
macy during the recent « turbot war ». The dispute included the Canadian 
arrest of a Spanish fishing vesse,, the Estai, beyond the 200 mile zone. 
Turbot, also known as Greenland halibu,, is considered a straddiing fish 
stock because it is present both within and adjacent to the 200 mile zone. 
The Canadian response to the straddiing stock issue involved a two-track 
strategy of unilateral action and multilateral negotiation. Canadian multi-
lateral efforts included participation in the United Nations Conferenee on 
Straddiing Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stock.. This paper 
examines the underlying causes of the straddiing stocks issue as well as the 
rights and obligaiions of coastal and high seas fishing ssates. 
Le présent article examine la condutte de la diplomatie ccnadienne 
durant la «crise du turbot». Pendant ce conflit, un vaisseau eepagnol, 
/'Estay, avait été arraisonné par la marine canadienne au-delà de la limite 
des 200 milles marins. Le turbot est un poisson dont lafréquence se raréfie, 
tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur de la zone des 200 milles. Devant la 
menace de disparition de l'espèc,, le Canada a doublé son action 
* This paper was prepared for Professor J. Maurice Arbour as part of the bachelor of civil 
law degree requirements at Université Laval. The author would like to acknowledge the 
assistance of David VanderZwaag of the Dalhousie University Faculty of Law, Ted 
McDorman of the University of Victoria Faculty of Law, and Judith Swan, CEO of 
Swansea Oceans Environment Inc. and former legal counsel for the South Pacific Forum 
Fisheries Agency. The author assumes sole responsibility for any errors of fact or interpre-
tation. 
** B.A. (Dalhousie) ; maîtrise en relations internationales (Université Laval), and L.L.L. 
anticipated 1996 (Université Laval). 
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unilatérale d'un effort intense de négociation multilatérale. Le présent 
article vise à exposer les causes de la réduciion des stocks de turbot, ainsi 
que les droits et obligaiions des États dans le cadre des activités de pêche. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The « turbot war» was about more than turbot. 
Turbot was the straw that broke the camel's back . 
J. Alan BEESLEY and Malcolm R O W E 
George Saville once observed, « [tjhere is more learning required to 
explain a law than went into the making of it2. » The making of the law that 
allowed Canadian fisheries officers to board and arrest foreign fishing 
vessels on the high seas was less onerous than the subsequent explanations 
required after the Spanish fishing vessel Estai was arrested on the high seas 
by Canadian fisheries officers3. The task of justifying the Canadian enforce-
ment action was made more burdensome because of its illegality under 
international law4. The counter-argument was that the Spanish vessel was 
not respecting its legal obligations under international law, specifically the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
If there is a framework of analysis to the international law questions 
involved in the events surrounding the arrest of Estai, also known as the 
« turbot war », it is within legal institutions such as the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)5 and the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization (NAFO). The failure of these two institutions to 
address the problem of fisheries management of straddling fish stocks 
resulted in Canadian efforts to establish the United Nations Conference on 
1. J.A. BEESLEY and M. R O W E , «The Basis in International Law for Canada's Actions in 
the « Turbot War », (December 1995) Canadian Councll on Internaiionll Law Bulletin 3. 
J. Alan Beesley is the former Canadian Ambassador to the U.N. Conference on Law 
of the Sea and Ambassador for Marine Conservation. Malcolm Rowe served as an 
advisor to the Canadian Fisheries Minister during the turbot dispute. 
2. English statesman (1633-1695) known for his opposition to the repeal of the Test and 
Habeas Corpus Acts. 
3. Coastal Fisheries Proteciion Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-33, amended by S.C. 1994, c. 14; 
SOR 94-362, SOR 95-136. The Estai was arrested on the high seas on March 9, 1995. 
4. According to the United Naiions Conveniion on the Law of the Sea, specifically Arti-
cles 87 and 92 ( 1 )) vessels on the high seas not only benefit from the freedom of the high 
seas, they are subject only to the exclusive jurisdiction of their flag state while on the 
high seas (subject to conditions). 
5. The 1982 United Naiions Conveniion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into force 
in November 1994 after 60 countries consented to ratification. The 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention's provisions relating to the fisheries can be considered a codification of 
customary law The International Court of Justice in Libya v. Malta, [1985] I.C.J. 13, 33 
(June 3,1985), found the 200 mile exclusive economic zone to be customary international 
law. 
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Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and the above-
mentioned unilateral enforcement action against the Spanish fishing vessel. 
On May 10, 1994, Canada amended its domestic fishing regulations, the 
Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, to enable Canadian fisheries officials to 
board and arrest any non-NAFO member fishing vessel6. In March, 1995, the 
legislation was again amended to include NAFO members, Spain and Portu-
gal, after a dispute over turbot allocations. The dispute erupted after a major 
reduction in the turbot quota allocated to the European Union (EU) which 
represents Spain and Portugal as well as other EU members within the 
NAFO organization. 
Canada had a two-track strategy to deal with EU and non-NAFO 
member overfishing practices vis-à-vis the straddling stocks problem. The 
first strategy was multilateral : it consisted of the so-called « legal initiative » 
with the objective of multilateral negotiations. The second strategy was 
unilateral : it resulted in the enactment of domestic legislation to allow 
unilateral enforcement action against non-NAFO member vessels and sub-
sequently Spanish and Portuguese vessels. 
The « legal initiative » consisted of a concerted effort to build a coalition 
among Law of the Sea experts as well as like-minded countries to lobby for 
changes which would address the straddling fish stock problem. The break-
through in this diplomatic effort occurred during the June 1992 Rio Summit, 
also known as the Earth Summit, where a resolution was passed to establish 
a conference which ultimately became known as the United Nations Confer-
ence on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. 
The Canadian strategy was influenced by the domestic fisheries situ-
ation as well as the global fisheries crisis. In March 1995, the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) released a report entitled The State of 
World Fisheries and Aquaculture which declared that at the beginning of the 
1990s about 69 per cent of the world's conventional species were fully 
exploited, overexploited, depleted or in the process of rebuilding as a result 
of depletion7. The straddling stocks issue is a fisheries management problem 
6. Non-NAFO member vessels include vessels from non-NAFO member states, stateless 
vessels, and « flags of convenience vessels ». « Flags of convenience » vessels are con-
sidered vessels that are registered under a nationality different than the true nationality 
of the vessel, for example, a Spanish vessel registers under the flag of Panama to avoid 
NAFO member regulations. 
7. FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, The State of World Fisheries and Agricul-
ture, Rome, FAO publication, 1995, p. 6. 
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for a number of countries such as Canada where the continental shelf 
extends beyond the EEZ8. 
The straddling groundfish stocks managed by NAFO in the Northwest 
Atlantic, especially cod and flounder, were in a state of collapse. In 1987, the 
spawning stock biomass for 3NO cod was estimated to be 200,000 tonnes. 
The most dramatic is 2J3KL cod, where the spawning stock biomass has 
declined by about 90 per cent in the past two years9. It is understandable that 
with the collapse of the Atlantic groundfish fishing industry that there was 
considerable domestic pressure on the Canadian government for action to 
combat overfishing of straddling stocks by Spanish and Portuguese fishing 
vessels. 
This paper will examine the Canadian strategy and action in an interna-
tional law context. First, the paper will summarize the weaknesses of the 
existing legal regimes, UNCLOS and NAFO, which propelled the Canadian 
government into taking both unilateral and multilateral action. UNCLOS 
requires that coastal states and high seas fishing states cooperate within 
regional fisheries organizations such as NAFO. Unfortunately, NAFO 
lacks effective enforcement powers and a compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanism. These weaknesses are compounded by an objection procedure 
which allows any NAFO member to object and not be bound by NAFO 
resolutions regarding issues such as fish allocations. 
Second, it is useful to examine the coastal state's rights and high seas 
fishing state's obligations vis-à-vis the conservation of straddling fish 
stocks under the UNCLOS regime. The provisions of Articles 63 (2) and 116 
are examined because some observers believe these articles justify unilat-
eral coastal state measures. These provisions, however, include specific 
limitations with regard to allocation and enforcement issues. 
Third, the events that led to the ultimate arrest of the Estai are summa-
rized because they reveal key elements necessary for the examination of the 
8. E. MELTZER, « Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks : The 
Non-sustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries », ( 1994) Ocean Development and Inter-
national Law 260-262. This article outlines global overfishing of straddling stocks : 
Pollock in the Bering Sea high sea « Donut Hole » ; pollock in the Sea of Okhotsk « Peanut 
Hole»; hake, southern blue whiting, and squid off Argentina's Patagonian Shelf. The 
Canadian straddling stocks, cod, American plaice, yellowtail flounder, witch flounder, 
redfish, Greenland halibut (turbot), are fished on the «nose» and «tail» of the conti-
nental shelf beyond the EEZ. In some areas, the straddling stocks are fished beyond the 
continental shelf, often in very deep water : orange roughy is fished in Challenger Plateau 
off New Zealand; redfish in the Barents Sea «Loop Hole», and horse mackerel and 
squid off Chile and Peru. 
9. NAFO, Meeting Proceedings of the General Council and Fisheries Commission for 
1993, Darthmouth, NAFO, 1993, p. .109 
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legality of such actions. Fourth, it is important to assess the legality of the 
Canadian actions and their possible legal justifications under not only the 
UNCLOS regime but also according to the international law concept of 
necessity and its precedents. 
Fifth, Canada's role will be examined in its multilateral efforts in the 
establishment and ultimate success of the United Nations Conference on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Finally, this 
paper assesses the success of the Canadian two-track strategy. 
1.2 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea10 
The major accomplishment of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea regarding fisheries management was the establishment of the 
200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Article 56 gives the coastal state 
sovereign rights within the EEZ for the purposes of exploring, exploiting, 
conserving, and managing living resources of the seabed, subsoil, and su-
peradjacent waters. 
Article 61 allows the coastal state to determine the allowable catch of 
living resources within the EEZ and to ensure through proper conservation 
and management measures that the living resources are not endangered. 
Furthermore, Article 61, requires that the coastal state and competent inter-
national organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, shall co-
operate to this end. 
Straddling stocks, such as turbot (also known as Greenland halibut), 
migrate beyond the 200-mile zone into international waters1 '. Articles 63 (2) 
and 118 require the establishment of regional fisheries organizations to 
manage the straddling stocks between the interests of coastal states and 
distant water fishing states. Under Article 118, states shall cooperate to 
create subregional or regional fisheries organization to conserve and manage 
high seas resources. Article 63 (2) addresses the issue of management of 
straddling stocks through regional organizations : 
10. Canada has not yet become a contracting party to UNCLOS. The reluctance of Canada 
and other industrialized countries, notably the United States, are related to their concerns 
regarding the Convention's deep seabed mining provisions. In July, 1994, a number of 
compromises resulted in the revision of the deep seabed provisions which allowed them 
to become more acceptable to these countries. 
11. The Canadian government argued that until 1987 there was no directed fishery for 
Greenland halibut outside 200 miles because the normal concentration of the halibut's 
biomass was inside 200 miles. The biomass concentration shifted during the late 1980's 
as the result of a change in environmental conditions (NAFO/FC Doc. 95/2, p. 27). 
M. KEIVER Law of the Sea 549 
[...] the coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall 
seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, 
to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the 
adjacent area. 
1.3 The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) 
Following the 1977 extension of the coastal jurisdiction to 200 nautical 
miles by Canada and the United States, the members of the International 
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF)12 decided to 
adopt a new convention. The new convention, the Convention on Multilat-
eral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, was signed on Octo-
ber 24, 1978 and established the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
(NAFO)13. 
The objective of NAFO is « to contribute through consultation and 
cooperation to the optimum utilization, rational management and conserva-
tion of fisheries resources» of the Northwest Atlantic14. The objective of 
«optimum utilization» has recently become controversial within NAFO 
because of the «two pillar» philosophy. Between 1979 and 1985, NAFO 
parties abided by the Total Allowable Catches (TAC) quotas which were 
determined by the « two pillars » of fisheries management : the more precau-
tionary « F.O.I15 » TAC versus « Fmax », the maintenance of the traditional 
allocation shares of NAFO member countries16. 
12. The ICNAF was established in 1949 as the result of a conference convened in Washington 
by the American government to manage problems affecting the fisheries of the Northwest 
Atlantic. The United States and 17 other countries eventually became members of 
ICNAF. Presently, the United States has observer status in NAFO. 
13. The Convention came into force on January 1, 1979 following the deposit with the 
Goverment of Canada the instruments of seven signatories. There are presently 15 mem-
bers of NAFO : Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, Cuba, Denmark (in respect of the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland), the European Union (EU), Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Latvia, Norway, Poland, Romania and the Russian Federation. (NAFO, NAFO Hand-
book, Dartmouth, NAFO Headquarters, 1994, introduction.) 
14. Convention of Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic, article II, 
para. 1 (hereinafter: «NAFO Convention»); NAFO, NAFO Handbook, Dartmouth, 
NAFO Headquarters, 1984, p. 12. The objective of «optimum utilization» has been 
interpreted by some critics not the equivalent of «maximum sustainable yield» and 
therefore not a conservation objective. 
15. F.o. 1 sets TACs at a level below the « maximum sustainable yield » (MSY) and provides 
a cautionary level of protection against errors in scientific assessments of stocks. 
16. B. APPLEBAUM, «The Straddling Stocks Problem: The Northwest Atlantic Situation, 
International Law, and Options for Coastal State Action » p. 8 (unpublished). A previous 
version of this paper was presented at the 23rd Annual Conference of the Law of the 
Sea Institute, 12-15 June 1989, at Noordwijk Aan Zee, Netherlands. 
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These differences in management philosophy exist between NAFO and 
the European Union (EU). Until the accession of Spain and Portugal to the 
EU in 1986, the EU abided by all NAFO conservation decisions. Between 
1986 and 1991, the EU which represents Spain and Portugal, took seven 
times the amount allocated to them17. The EU's defense of its unilaterally 
set quotas is based on NAFO's objection procedure under Article XII of the 
NAFO Convention. The objection procedure allows any NAFO member to 
object and not be bound by NAFO resolutions regarding issues such as fish 
allocations. 
Canada contended that this overfishing was not only a breach of the 
UNCLOS but also the NAFO convention. Spain was accused of not only 
overfishing but also using destructive fishing practices such as the use of 
small mesh gear to catch immature fish stocks18. The objection procedure 
and the lack of a compulsory dispute settlement procedure were two major 
weaknesses of NAFO19. Furthermore, NAFO has no real mandate to 
enforce conservation measures. 
During the 1988 NAFO annual meeting a resolution was passed that 
member countries avoid excessive use of the objection procedures. One 
option was to amend Article XII which would limit permissible objections. 
Unfortunately, in order to pass such an amendment, it would have to be 
supported by all member countries20. Another option would be to argue that 
NAFO Article XII does not provide a jurisdiction for overfishing by EU 
countries. Canada would have to argue that Article 117 of the 1982 
UNCLOS has become part of customary international law and must guide 
any interpretation of Article XII21. 
17. W. GRAHAM, « International Law Issues in the 1995 Turbot War : A Brief Discussion », 
(1995) 1 Canadian International Lawyer 82-84. 
18. Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlaniic Fisheries, 
C.T.S., 24 October 1978; J.A. BEESLEY and M. R O W E , loc. cit., note 1, 3. 
19. NAFO Convention, article XII, allows a member which presents an objection within 
60 days not to be bound by a proposal. 
20. O C E A N S INSTITUTE OF CANADA, Managing Fisheries Resources Beyond 200 Miles: 
Canada's Options to Protect Northwett Atlantic Straddiing Stock,, Ottawa, January 
1990, p. 31. 
21. Id., pp. 31-32. An interesting argument regarding Article 117 and the duty to cooperate 
was presented in O C E A N S INSTITUTE OF CANADA, op. cit., note 20, pp. 31-32: «The 
argument that the duty to cooperate with respect to the conservation of the living 
resources has become part of international law has considerable force not only in light 
of the consensus of state opinion embodied in the 1982 Convention, but also in light of 
widespread state practice concerning participation in international fisheries organiza-
tions such as ICNAF and NAFO since 1945. The notion that Article XII of the NAFO 
Convention must be interpreted in the context of this duty is supported by Article 31 
(3) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides that in interpreting a 
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Another major problem that confronted NAFO was the unregulated 
fishing activities of non-NAFO members such as Panama, Belize, Hondu-
ras, Sierra Leone, Venezuela, Morocco, Vanuatu, and the Republic of 
Korea in the NAFO Regulatory Area. Many of these vessels were « flags of 
convenience » vessels i.e. the vessels were not registered under their true 
nationality which is often Spanish or Portuguese22. Flag-of-convenience 
vessels operating in the NAFO Regulatory Area increased harvests signifi-
cantly during the second half of the 1980s to estimated peak of 47,300 tonnes 
in 1991. From 1984 to 1993 vessels from non-members harvested more than 
20 per cent of all catches in the NAFO Regulatory Area, taking an estimated 
325,000 tonnes of NAFO managed groundfish23. 
2. Straddling Stocks and UNCLOS : The Rights of Coastal States 
and the Duties of High Sea Fishing States 
2.1 UNCLOS Article 63 (2) : The Obligation to Seek to Agree 
Various observers accused Spain of not meeting its obligations under 
Article 63 (2) as well as the high seas fishing obligations under Articles 116 
to 119. This view suggests that Article 63 (2) creates an obligation for coastal 
and high seas fishing states to seek to agree regarding measures for the 
management of straddling stocks : 
[...] the coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall 
seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, 
to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the 
adjacent area24 [emphasis added]. 
Bob Applebaum, the Director-General of the International Directorate 
at the Canadian Fisheries Department during the « Turbot War », asserts an 
interesting interpretation of the obligation to « seek to agree » under Article 
63 (2). Applebaum concludes that Article 63 (2) provides legal basis for the 
« consistency principle » i.e. the principle that the measures taken outside 
the zone « must be consistent » with measures taken entirely unilaterally by 
the coastal state inside the zone. Applebaum justifies this interpretation 
with the following: « the obligation arises solely by virtue of the coastal 
treaty, « There shall be taken into account, together with the context [...] (c) any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties ». » Text of the 
Vienna Convention : see I. BROWNLIE (ed.), Basic Documents in International Law, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 349. 
22. NAFO, op. cit., note 9, p. 73 ; OCEANS INSTITUTE OF CANADA, op. cit., note 20, p. 30. 
23. NAFO, Meeting of Proceedings of the General Council and Fisheries Commission for 
1994, Dartmouth, NAFO, 1995, p. 92. 
24. UNCLOS (1982), article 63.2. 
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state's legal status as such, with duties, rights and interests as regards this 
stock both inside and outside the zone25 ». 
Professor Barbara Kwiatkowska, Faculty of Law, University of 
Utrecht, commented on Canada's argument for a «consistency rule» and 
concluded it remained an open question : 
[...] although at variance with Article 63 (2), [the consistency rule] does not appear 
to contradict the substance of the obligations there established. Whether this 
«consistency rule» could be perceived as testifying to a new legal concept of a 
coastal state's « special interest» in the 200-mile zone/high sea resources beyond 
200 miles, as claimed by Canada and considered by some authors to reflect general 
customary law or at least a subregional custom in the North Atlantic, remains an 
open question26. 
Interestingly, Applebaum also suggests that Article 63 gives the coastal 
state a «non-limiting effect» regarding the obligation to participate in a 
process of seeking to agree on measures outside its limits. This obligation is 
based on Article 61 which requires the coastal state to ensure the mainte-
nance of the resources within its zone. It is Applebaum's application of the 
« non-limiting effect » which could be considered controversial insofar that 
he suggests that coastal states « have the right to take other steps » which 
seems to suggest unilateral action if there is no agreement on conservation 
measures : 
[...] however the coastal state's obligation to « seek to agree » in no way limits the 
rights of the coastal state that flow from its duty to ensure the maintenance of the 
resources within its zone [...} In other words, having sought to agree, and failed, the 
coastal state has the duty and the right to take other steps27. 
2.2 Articles 116 to 119 : Superior Rights of Coastal States 
Article 117 is related to the question of the obligation to conclude a 
fisheries management agreement because it requires all States to take or 
cooperate in taking « such measures for their respective nationals as may be 
necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas. » 
Article 118 requires states exploiting living resources in the same area of the 
high seas to « enter into negotiations with a view to taking measures neces-
sary for the conservation of living resources concerned. » Article 119, enti-
tled «Conservation of the living resources of the high seas», includes 
several paragraphs that outline the possible factors to be considered in 
25. B. APPLEBAUM, loc. cit., note 16, 6-7. Applebaum argues that the consistency rule has 
been incorporated into the NAFO Convention's Article XI, paragraph 3. 
26. B. KWIAKOWSKA, « The High Sea Fisheries Regime : At a Point of No Return ? », (1993) 
8 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law Ï26, 333-334. 
27. B. APPLEBAUM, loc. cit., note 16, 7. 
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establishing the maximum sustainable yield of fish stocks harvested on the 
high seas. 
Article 116 has been suggested as justification for unilateral extension 
of fisheries management measures from the coastal state's zone into the 
high seas. According to this view, Article 116 gives states the right for their 
nationals to fish on the high seas, but the right is subject to the rights, duties 
and interests of coastal states28. Article 116 states : 
All states have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas 
subject to : 
(a) their treaty obligations ; 
(b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States provided for, inter 
alia, in article 63, paragraph 2, and articles 64 to 67 ; and 
(c) the provisions of this section. 
Edward Miles and William Burke consider that Article 116 grants the 
coastal state superior rights over straddling stocks, therefore, in the absence 
of agreed measures the coastal state could establish measures that would 
apply to all states fishing straddling stocks, including the high seas29. Burke, 
however, argues that the coastal state's superior rights are limited to con-
servation measures and does not extend to allocation issues on the high 
seas30. 
Furthermore, Miles and Burke argue the coastal state could demand 
that these states comply, and if refused, seek a remedy through compulsory 
dispute settlement mechanism31. Canada has not yet become a party to 
UNCLOS, and therefore, it is not bound by the compulsory dispute settle-
ment mechanism. If Canada decided to ratify UNCLOS, the amendments 
to the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act would be in conflict with the Con-
vention's Articles on high seas fishing. Moreover, the non-parties to the 
Convention, would not be bound to adhere to the compulsory dispute 
settlement mechanism. 
2.3 Dispute Settlement : The 1958 Convention Revisited 
A second, if somewhat unorthodox option, is available : the provisions 
of the 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
28. OCEANS INSTITUTE OF CANADA, op. cit., note 20 p. 66. 
29. E.L. M I L E S and W.T. BURKE, «Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling 
Stocks», (1989) 20 Ocean Development and International Law 343, 352. 
30. W.T. BURKE, «The Law of the Sea Convention Provisions on Conditions of Access of 
Fisheries Subject to National Jurisdiction », (1984) 73 Oregon Law Review 113. 
31. E.L. MILES and T. BURKE, loc. cit., note 29, 352. 
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Resources of the High Seas which permit unilaterally prescribed conserva-
tion regulations by a coastal state over stocks for adjacent high seas fisheries 
in default of agreement to be submitted to binding dispute settlement on the 
basis of agreed scientific standards. The option exists if Canada does be-
come a party to the 1958 Convention. Most importantly, Spain and Portugal 
are members to the 1958 Convention. Regarding the issue of compatibility, 
Article 311 (1) of UNCLOS requires that the 1982 Convention shall prevail, 
however, the word « prevail » does not mean replacement or lapse of the 
1958 Convention32. 
The perceived difficulty with the 1958 Convention is related to the 
argument that the Convention was intended to apply to fish stocks adjacent 
to the territorial seas (12 miles) and not the EEZ (200 miles). The counter-
argument is that the 1958 Convention does not place an outer limit on the 
distance of adjacent fish stocks subject to coastal state preference33. Miles 
and Burke consider the extension of coastal state preference beyond the 
EEZ in a retrospective manner : « the 1958 provisions potentially concerned 
a far larger problem than coastal states now face, since fishing areas adjacent 
to 200-mile EEZs are a lot less significant than those outside a 12-mile 
exclusive zone34 ». 
Despite the 1958 Convention's allowance for unilateral conservation 
measures by coastal states there are no enforcement measures specified. 
There are also uncertainty regarding unilateral enforcement measures be-
yond the 200-mile zone under of the 1982 UNCLOS provisions. Article 73 
of UNCLOS allows coastal states enforcement rights within the exclusive 
economic zone. 
Furthermore, this «enforcement limitation» is highlighted by provi-
sions regarding anadromous stocks, such as salmon, where enforcement of 
regulations beyond the 200-mile zone is only permitted if agreement has 
been reached with other fishing states (Article 66 (3) (d))35. Burke was very 
precise regarding unilateral enforcement beyond the 200-mile zone : « there 
is no basis in any source of law that would permit unilateral enforcement of 
exclusively prescribed management measures beyond an EEZ36 ». 
32. B. APPLEBAUM, loc. cit., note 16, 11. 
33. D. VANDERZWAAG, «The Management of Straddling Stocks: Stilling the Troubled 
Waters of the Grand Banks », in D. VANDRZWAAG, Canadian Ocean Law and Policy, 
Toronto, Butterworths, 1992, p. 136. 
34. E.L. MILES and T. BURKE, loc. cit., note 29, 353. 
35. D. VANDERZWAAG, loc. cit., note 33, 129. 
36. W.T. BURKE, « Fishing in the Bering Sea Donut : Straddling Stocks and the New Inter-
national Law of the Fisheries», (1989) 16 Ecology Law Quarterly 303. 
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A second issue concerns allocation measures unilaterally taken by the 
coastal state beyond the 200-mile zone. As mentioned in the preceding 
pages, the coastal state has no authority to prescribe regulations regarding 
fish stock allocations on the high seas. The 1982 Convention, UNCLOS, is 
silent on allocation criteria, and therefore, the coastal states would have to 
rely on customary law where there is no consensus on the subject37. 
In conclusion, the reason why there was no Canadian attempt at any 
form of « dispute settlement » via UNCLOS38 or the 1958 Convention was 
that the measures used to accomplish two major objectives in the turbot 
dispute, unilateral enforcement measures and regulation of allocations be-
yond the EEZ, would be considered not within the rights of the coastal state. 
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that many of these arguments were 
based upon unsettled legal concepts and would involve the high risk of a 
negative decision. 
3. NAFO : A Place to Debate 
3.1 A New Approach in NAFO 
NAFO is not, I sugges,, the place to debate questions 
of internaiionll law, though I can assure you that 
Canada believes its actions are defensible under 
internaiionll law . 
W.A. Row AT, 
Deputy Minister of Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
The arrest of the Kristina Logos on April 2,1994, a Canadian registered 
trawler which flew the Panamanian flag on the high seas, marked the 
beginning of an aggressive stance which was implemented by the new 
Canadian government's fisheries minister Brian Tobin. On May 10, 1994, 
Mr. Tobin introduced an amendment to the Coastal Fisheries Protection 
Act which would enable Canadian fisheries officers to board and arrest 
foreign vessels violating conservation measures in international waters. The 
37. D. VANDERZWAAG, loc. cit., note 33, 128. 
38. J.G. MERRILLS, International Dispute Settlement, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1984, 
p. 120, outlines the obligations under UNCLOS Article 287 which requires that states 
make a written declaration accepting that disputes may be refered to one or more 
tribunals: «Where both parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure that 
procedure is to be used, unless otherwise agreed. Where, however, they have accepted 
different procedures (or one party has not accepted any procedure), then the dispute 
may be refered to arbitration. » 
39. Statement by the Head of the Canadian Delegation on the New Canadian Legislation : 
REPORT OF GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING, Meeting Proceedings of the General Council 
and Fisheries Commission, Dartmouth, NAFO 19-23 September 1994, p. 94. 
556 Les Cahiers de Droit (1996) 37 C. de D. 543 
amendment included key phrases that emphasized the necessity of the 
measures : 
5.1 Parliament [...] declares that the purpose of section 5.2 is to enable Canada to 
take urgent action necessary to prevent further destruction of those stocks and to 
permit their rebuilding, while continuing to seekeffective international solutions40. 
The amendment was originally targeted against non-NAFO members 
which fished in the NAFO Regulatory Area, however, the EU correctly 
reasoned that the amendment could add the names of NAFO Contracting 
Party countries that Canada could consider unilaterally not to be fishing 
according to Canadian conservation requirements. 
During the 1994 NAFO annual meeting, September 19-23, in Dart-
mouth, Nova Scotia, there were controversial presentations delivered by 
both the Canadian and EU representatives in response to the recent Cana-
dian legislation. The Canadian representative began his presentation with an 
overview of the fishing crisis and the measures taken by the Canadian gov-
ernment. He admitted that there was a profound resource crisis in straddling 
stocks and that the problem was further exasperated by ecological factors 
such as water temperatures, salinity, and predator-prey relationships. 
Canada had instituted a moratoria for cod and flounder stocks and 
decided that Greenland halibut (turbot) had become a threatened resource. 
In response, Canada reduced its domestic quotas for the NAFO zone 2+3 G. 
Greenland halibut from 25,000 tonnes to 6,500 tonnes (a 75 per cent reduc-
tion). These measures, however, related only to waters under Canada's 
national jurisdiction. 
Regarding international waters and the NAFO Regulatory Area, the 
Canadian representative argued that the conservation measures taken there 
must match those measures taken in waters under Canadian jurisdiction. 
The Canadian representative emphasized that despite the Canadian belief in 
the ultimate success of the United Nations Convention of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks interim measures would be neces-
sary. 
The response by the EU representative to this threat of unilateral action 
was swift. He made reference to the FAO Compliance Agreement and that 
the EU had initiated procedures to ratify the Agreement. The Compliance 
Agreement, which will be part of the Code of Conduct for Responsible 
40. The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, supra, note 3. Article 5.2 — No person, being 
aboard a foreign vessel of a prescribed class, shall, in the NAFO Regulatory Area, fish 
or prepare to fish for a straddling stock in contravention of any of the prescribed 
conservation and management measures. 
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Fisheries41, is considered a critical measure in preventing fishing vessels 
from « reflagging » in order to circumvent international agreed upon conser-
vation measures42. 
There was no doubt that the EU representative was attempting to tie 
the two issues of the EU ratification of the Compliance Agreement as well 
as the negotiations at the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks to the Canadian legislation, espe-
cially when he noted that other NAFO Contracting Parties shared the EU 
view that there was no consensus on this issue : 
However, the law allows the Canadian Authorities to amend the Regulation over-
night to cover any new species and any new Flag State including the Contracting 
Parties. [...] In this regard one may ask the quesiion why should we all do our best 
to endeavour to estabiish code of conduct for responsible fishing underway within 
the framework ofFAO, and a model for the management of straddiing fish stocks 
and highly migratory fish stocks under negotiations under the auspices of the 
United Nations^. [Emphasis of EU Representative.] 
The Canadian Deputy Minister of Fisheries continued to outline the 
difficulty in eliminating illegal fishing activities by vessels reflagged by 
countries such as Panama and Honduras : a joint NAFO demarche, with a 
deadline of April 1994, was made to these countries, however, the vessels 
remained. Despite indications of cooperation from these countries, the 
problem continued because the local fines had been small and ineffective44. 
41. The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries was formulated upon instructions from 
FAO. It is to be consistent with the 1982 UNCLOS and to have as its purpose the concept 
of « responsible fisheries » i.e. the sustainable utilization of fishery resources. The code 
consists of five introductory articles : Nature and scope ; Objectives ; Relationship with 
other international instruments ; Implementation, monitoring and updating ; and Appli-
cation of the code to developing states. The introductory articles are followed by seven 
articles : general principles, fisheries management, fishing operations, aquaculture devel-
opment, integration of fisheries into coastal area management, post harvest practices 
and trade and fisheries research. The completed code was scheduled to be presented a 
Twenty-eighth Session of the FAO Conference in November 1995. 
42. G. MOORE, « Current Legal Developments : The FAO Compliance Agreement », (1995) 
10 The Internaiionll Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 412-425. The FAO Agreement 
on Compliance was the result of a series of formal and informal negotiations initiated 
by the FAO during 1993 with FAO member countries and non-member countries as well 
as representatives of regional fishery bodies. An agreement was developed and the 
Twenty-Seventh Session of the FAO Conference in November 1993 approved the Agree-
ment to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Mea-
sures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (Compliance Agreement). It is now open for 
signature and will come into force upon the twenty-fifth signature. 
43. NAFO, op. cit., note 23, p. 90. 
44. Id., p. 93. 
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The Canadian Deputy Minister further supported his case by presenting 
statistics regarding fish catches by a total of 24 different Non-Contracting 
Party vessels that were sighted in the NAFO Regulatory Area : 
January 4 vessels with an estimated catch of 425 tonnes 
February 8 l,150t 
March 10 1,275t 
April 12 1,4501 
May 15 2,5001 
Total 6,800145 
He also observed that while these illegal activities were taking place 
NAFO members were respecting moratoria on most straddling stocks espe-
cially Canada who closed the fishery for virtually all the stocks concerned. 
Furthermore, he added, since the amendment of the Coastal Fisheries Pro-
tection Act and its coming into force on May 30, 1994, fishing of straddling 
stocks by flag of convenience and stateless vessels has stopped46. 
Turbot was also on the menu ' NAFO establlshed a Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC), for the first time ever, for Greenland halibut at 27,000 tonnes 
for 1995 in response to advice from NAFO's Scientific Council. This con-
clusion was reached after the Canadian representative had outlined 3 op-
tions for Greenland Halibut in the 2+3 zone : 
[...] firstly, no fishing in 1995, secondly, to set a TAC at 25 % of the recent catch 
which would allow a TAC of about 15000 tons [sic] for 1995 which would be 
comparable to the Canadian reductions inside its zone... A third option would 
involve a higher risk to conservation and consist of a TAC of 20000 tons based on 
the average stable catches from 1981-1986 of 25000 tons47. 
The Canadian representative concluded his summary of the options by 
stating that 15,000 tonnes was Canada's preference. It should be noted that 
Canada had already reduced its own 1994 quota for 2+3 Greenland halibut 
from 25,000 to 6,500 tonnes (75 per cent reduction)48. The response from the 
EU representative was that he interpreted the Scientific Council's advice as 
recommending that the fishing effort be reduced so as not to exceed a 
harvest of 40,000 tonnes. The Canadian representative responded that the 
Scientific Council was not recommending a TAC of 40,000 tonnes rather that 
45. Ibid. 
46. Id., p. 94. The Canadian Deputy Minister was very precise in his statement how the new 
policy was implemented by Canadian officials : « Before the legislation came into force, 
every such vessel was visited by Canadian authorities at sea. The nature of the problem 
and the objectives of the new Canadian regulations was explained to them. We even 
provided Spanish and Portuguese translations of the Canadian legislation to these vessels 
to ensure they fully understood the situation ». 
47. Id., p. 128. 
48. Id., p. 66. 
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current fishing levels (1994) were estimated to catch 40,000 tonnes and there 
was a need for a significant cut in this effort49. 
As a result of this divergence of interpretation, the EU proposed a TAC 
of 40,000 tonnes which was not supported by the other N AFO Contracting 
Parties. The representative of Norway proposed a compromise of a TAC of 
27,000 tonnes. This proposal was adopted by the other NAFO members, 
however, the EU abstained50. 
On February 1, 1995, at a special meeting in Brussels, Belgium, NAFO 
decided on the allocations of the 27,000 tonnes TAC for Greenland halibut 
for 1995. There were three proposals, Canadian, European, and Cuban. A 
vote was suggested on the Cuban proposal which allocated 3,400 tonnes 
(12.59 per cent) to the EU and 16,300 tonnes (60.37 per cent) to Canada. The 
proposed EU allocation represented only 12 per cent of the EU 1994 turbot 
catches. 
The EU feared the outcome of a vote and suggested to the Chairman to 
take the exceptional measure of having a vote on whether to vote on the 
allocation. The Chairman concluded that the majority favoured a vote. A 
narrow vote, 6 to 5 with two abstentions, decided the controversial alloca-
tions which gave Canada 60.37 per cent and the EU 12.59 per cent of the 
1995 quota51. 
On February 5, 1995, Canadian Fisheries Minister Tobin wrote to the 
EU Fisheries Commissioner Emma Bonino indicating that Canada was 
prepared to consider « transitional measures » to allow the EU to adjust to 
the 1995 quota on the understanding the EU would not invoke the NAFO 
objection procedure52. The EU objected to the term «transitional mea-
sures » because it was considered the equivalent of a tacit acceptance of the 
Brussels allocations, and therefore, could be used a precedent for future 
allocations. The Canadian response proved inflexible regarding a change of 
terminology53. 
49. Id., p. 129. 
50. Id., p. 131. 
51. NAFO, Report of the Fisheries Commission ; Special Meeiing, Brussels, NAFO, 30 Jan-
uary-1 February 1995, pp. 14-16. The vote was carried by six Parties in favour of the 
allocation (Canada, Cuba, Iceland, Japan, Norway, Russia). Two Parties abstained Den-
mark (on behalf of the Faroe Islands) and the Republic of Korea and five Parties were 
opposed (Estonia, the EU, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). 
52. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL T R A D E CANADA, « Chronology of Key Events : 
Canada-EU Turbot Dispute» Press Release, (April 1995). 
53. F. KINGSTON, Delegation of the European Commission in Canada, interview, Ottawa, 
November 16, 1995. 
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February 14, 1995, Brian Tobin announced that the 40 Spanish and 
Portuguese boats on the Grand Banks must cease their fishing operations. 
The EU Fisheries Commissioner argued the turbot allocation was unfair and 
that the Europeans would continue to fish because she claimed they were 
entitled to a unilateral quota of 19,000 tonnes54. 
March 3, 1995, Brian Tobin introduced regulations imposing a 60-day 
moratorium on Spanish and Portuguese boats fishing turbot in NAFO wa-
ters outside the 200-mile zone. These regulations allowed Canadian fisheries 
officers to arrest European vessels and to remove fishing nets. March 6, 
1995, the European Council of Ministers rejected the proposal for a 60-day 
moratorium. 
Tobin, however, announced that the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans and Canadian Coast Guard vessels, backed up by a naval destroyer, 
were patrolling the nose and tail of the Grand Banks and would intercept 
foreign fishing trawlers. After the announcement, about half the Spanish 
boats left55. 
March 9, 1995, Canadian fisheries officers boarded and seized the 
Spanish fishing vessel Estai for fishing contrary to Canadian law. Three days 
later, the Estai was docked in St. John's where the captain and the vessel 
were charged with fishing for a straddling stock, Greenland halibut, in 
contravention of the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act56. After the arrest of 
the Estai several attempts were made to reach a negotiated settlement. On 
April 15, 1995, a bilateral agreement was reached between Canada and the 
EU which was ratified the following day57. 
54. K. Cox, «How the Dispute Developed» The Globe and Mail (April 17, 1995) A-4. 
February 22, 1995, the EU Commission of Permanent Representatives decided to set a 
unilateral quota of 18,630 tonnes for 1995. The EU Commission did not disagree with 
the 27,000 tonne TAC, however, they objected to the quota allocated to the European 
Union (see also FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA, loc. cit., 
note 52). 
55. K. Cox, loc. cit., note 54. 
56. Ibid. 
57. D. FREESTONE, « The Canada/European Union : Canada and EU Reach Agreement to 
Settle the Estai Dispute», (1995) 10 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law, 397-411. As a result of the agreement, Canada withdrew the appication of the 
Coastal Fisheries Protection Act to Spain and Portugal. The illegal fishing charges against 
the Estai were subsequently dropped. The owners and captain of Estai have started a 
civil action against the Canadian government in the Federal Court of Canada. The 
government of Spain has asked the International Court of Justice in the Hague for leave 
to bring a case against Canada. See «Who Won the Great Turbot W a r ? » The Globe 
and Mail (March 16, 1996) A-3. 
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3.2 The Bilateral Canada-EU Agreement 
The less important part of the agreement dealt with 
turbot quotas. The more important part dealt with 
new control measures. The centre piece of these new 
control measures is 100 % observer coverage for 
EU and Canadian fleess in waters under NAFO ju-
risdiction^ . 
Brian TOBIN, Canadian Fisheries Minister 
As with many fishermanss tales, Brian Tobin's ver-
sion of the agreemett that ended the six-week dis-
pute resembles in some respects the big one that got 
away^ 
The Globe and Mail 
Canada and Spain came within hours of a naval gunboat confrontation 
before the EU ambassadors decided to ratify the bilateral fishing agree-
ment with Canada. The threat of the naval gunboats and last-minute Cana-
dian concessions are considered to have influenced a diplomatic settlement 
of the dispute. Canada agreed not to pursue a legal case against the captain 
of the Estai who had been accused of overfishing. The EU reserved the 
right to request a larger allocation of turbot the next year when the quotas 
are negotiated by NAFO. Furthermore, Spain and Portugal were allowed 
an additional 5,000 tonnes of turbot in 1995 as a «last-minute deal 
sweetener60». 
Canadian officials were criticized because the Agreement «turns a 
blind eye » to large amounts of turbot that had already been caught. During 
the last few days of negotiations, Mr. Tobin had reduced previous Canadian 
estimates of turbot caught to date by the Spanish to between 4,000 to 7,000 
tonnes61. 
Canadian officials in their original negotiations in Brussels had claimed 
an additional 5,000 tonnes had been caught to date. EU officials, however, 
argued that the original Canadian estimates were too high. If the original 
Canadian estimates had been used in the Agreement, the Spanish 
58. B. TOBIN, «The Need for a New Conservation Ethic», notes for an address to a joint 
conference of the Fisheries Council of Canada and the National Fisheries Institute, 
Boston, October 12, 1995, 8. 
59. P. KORING, «Spanish Nets Still Bulging» The Globe and Mail (April 17, 1995) 1, 4. 
60. J. S ALLOT, « Naval Threat Brought Turbot Deal » The Globe and Mail (April 17, 1995) 
1,4. 
61. P. KORING, loc. cit., note 59, 4. 
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government would have been obliged to order its vessels to immediately 
cease fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area because they would have caught 
their allocation62. 
The EU increased their share of the 1995 turbot allocation from 
3,400 tonnes (12.59 per cent) to 10,000 tonnes (37 per cent) of 27,000 tonnes 
of the total allowable catch. Canada reduced its original 1995 quota from 
16,300 tonnes (60.37 per cent) to 10,000 tonnes (37 per cent). Russia and 
Japan retained their 1995 quotas respectively at 3,200 tonnes (11.85 percent) 
and 2,600 tonnes (9.63 per cent). The quota for « other» members remained 
at 1,500 tonnes (5.56 per cent). 
The Agreement also was significant because it proposed the division of 
the zone, which contained straddling turbot stock, into two parts. It was later 
approved, that the 1995 Canadian turbot allocation of 10,000 tonnes was 
divided into two zones : a new northern zone which is entirely within 
Canadian waters (2+3K) and a southern zone (3LMNO) which includes the 
nose and tail of the Grand Banks and the Flemish cap beyond the 200-mile-
limit63. 
Therefore, Canada received a 1995 turbot allocation for the northern 
zone of 7,000 tonnes and 3,000 tonnes for the southern zone. Only Canada 
can receive allocations from the northern zone even though it is included in 
the calculation for the total allowable catch of turbot. 
The Bilateral Agreement also proposed the 1996 total allowable catch 
at 27,000 tonnes64. Robert Rochon, Director-General of Foreign Affairs' 
Legal Bureau, and William Rowat, Deputy Minister of Fisheries (Canada), 
were engaged in shuttle diplomacy to Moscow and Tokyo to persuade 
Russia and Japan to reduce by 20 per cent their turbot allocations for 1996 
in order to meet the EU ' s demand for an increase65. The EU increased their 
allocation from 10,000 tonnes to 11,070 tonnes. The EU emphasized they 
needed to increase their share from 50 per cent to 55.35 per cent of the 20,000 
tonnes available in the southern zone (3LMNO)66. 
The Agreement included a new measures to ensure compliance with 
NAFO measures : such as observers required aboard all fishing vessels 
62. ibid. 
63. Adopted at the NAFO Special Meeting, June 7-9, 1995 in Toronto. 
64. NAFO's allocation key for 1996 and thereafter for Greenland halibut in 3LMNO will be 
in the ratio of 10:3 for the EU and Canada (aside from allocations to other Contracting 
Parties). (EC-Canada Bilateral Agreement, annex II.) 
65. E. WISEMAN, Acting Director-General, International Directorate, Canadian Department 
of Fisheries and Oceans, interview, Ottawa, November 16, 1995. 
66. B. STEINBOCK, International Directorate, Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 
interview, Ottawa, January 30, 1996. 
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(100 per cent coverage), a satellite tracking system (35 per cent coverage), 
dockside inspections of all vessels at each port of call, special powers to 
order a vessel to port for inspection, and authority to seal fish holds in order 
to preserve evidence. 
There were a few conservation measures which remained outstanding 
such as a minimum fish size to protect juvenile Greenland halibut which was 
later set at 30 cm during the NAFO Annual Meeting in September, 199567. 
This should be considered inadequate protection of the turbot's ability to 
reproduce : a turbot's reproductive maturity is at three years and it should 
measure 60 to 65 cm. 
The Bilateral Agreement proposed to discuss the controversial mesh 
size of 120 millimetres, which was aboard the Estai when it was arrested. 
NAFO later established the minimum mesh size at 130 mm for all ground-
fish and flatfish during NAFO's annual meeting in September, 199568. 
At the NAFO annual meeting in September, 1995, the measures out-
lined in the Bilateral EU-Canada Agreement were extended to apply to all 
NAFO members. There remains two unresolved issues : compulsory dis-
pute settlement and the NAFO objection procedure. Earl Wiseman, Acting 
Director-General of International Directorate of the Canadian Fisheries 
Department, hopes to soon pursue the subject of compulsory dispute settle-
ment on a bilateral basis. Presently, there are no plans to resolve the 
objection procedure problem69. 
4. The Legality of the Estai Arrest 
Necessity if necessary but not necessarily nncessity. 
Apologies to W.L. MacKenzie King, 
Canadian Prime Minister 1935-1948 
4.1 The Doctrine of Necessity 
There is considerable controversy regarding the legality of the arrest of 
the Spanish vessel Estai. Legal justification used for unilateral action is not 
a new concept, as illustrated by Daniel Patrick Moynihan in his book On the 
Law of Nations : 
From the Caroline affair of 1837 (Canadian militia having crossed onto the Ameri-
can side of the Niagara River and destroyed a steamboat used by rebels) we have 
67. FISHERIES COMMISSION, Report of the Fisheries Commission, 17th Annual Meeting, 
Dartmouth, 11-15 September 1995, p. 10. 
68. Ibid. 
69. E. WISEMAN, loc. cit., note 65. 
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Daniel Webster 's celebrated dictum that the right of self-defence may extend to 
such incursions when « the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, 
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation70. » 
One of the legal justifications for the incursion is the concept of neces-
sity which is often confused in doctrine and in practice with right of self-de-
fense. This distinction was outlined in a memorandum, dated April 19,1994, 
on the doctrine of necessity prepared by the Legal Bureau of Foreign Affairs 
(Canada) : 
Unlike self-defence and counter-measures, which also preclude wrongdoing, the 
operation of the doctrine of necessity does not presuppose the existence of a 
wrongful act committed by another State whose right is infringed by the State acting 
out necessity. In circumstances of necessity, the other State may be innocent or 
_ "i* 71 
guilty". 
It is important to remember that doctrine of necessity was used to 
justify the arrest of « stateless », reflagged vessels, or flag of convenience 
vessels72 such as Kristina Logos33 as well as Spanish and Portuguese ves-
sels, such as the Esta.. The Legal Bureau of the Canadian department of 
Foreign Affairs prepared the following justification for enforcement mea-
sures against flag of convenience vessels : 
An act that would otherwise constitute a breach of an obligation is not wrongful if 
taken in a state of necessity, where an essential interest of the state is threatened by 
a grave and imminent peril threatening the livelihood of scores of thousands of 
Canadians and the economy of the Atlantic provinces [...] In the short term enforce-
ment action on the high seas is the only way to stop the fishing and save the stocks74. 
The recent Canadian action on the high seas is certainly not the first 
time that necessity was invoked to justify conservation measures. In 1893, 
the Russian Imperial Government had been concerned regarding the in-
70. D.P. MOYNIHAN, On the Law of Naiion,, Cambridge, Havard University Press, 1990, 
p. 132. 
71. P. KIRSCH, «Canadian Practice in International Law», in Canadian Yearbook of Inter-
national Law, vol. 32, Vancouver, U.B.C. Press, 1994, p. 312. 
72. T.L. MCDORM AN, « Stateless Fishing Vessels, International Law and the U.N. High Seas 
Fisheries Conference», (1994) 25 Journal ofMaritime Law and Commerce 531, outlined 
some situations where fishing vessels may be considered stateless : « For fishing vessels, 
statelessness may arise where the vessel's existing flag State has accepted an interna-
tional agreement to reduce or stop high seas fishing in a given area and the vessel does 
not wish to be subject to the flag State's law, so it revokes its flag and does not acquire 
another one. A fishing vessel may find itself as stateless if it utilizes several flags, changing 
as a matter of convenience [it becomes a flag of convenience vessel]. » 
73. The Kristina Logos was arrested on April 2, 1994, for illegal fishing on the high seas by 
the Canadian government. It had been reflagged as a Panamanian vessel, however, its 
registration was cancelled after it had been determined that it had a Portuguese crew 
and there was evidence of Canadian ownership. 
74. P. KIRSCH, loc. cit., note 71, 312. 
M . K.EIVER Law of the Sea 565 
crease in sealing activities by British and American fishermen near Russian 
territorial waters. To avert the danger of extermination of the seals, and 
despite the fact that the seal hunt took place outside Russian territorial 
waters, the Russian government issued a decree that prohibited the seal 
hunt in an area that formed part of the high seas. 
The Russian government justified its actions because of « absolute 
necessity » in view of the imminent opening of hunting season. The govern-
ment had emphasized the provisional nature of the measure and it proposed 
the negotiation of an agreement as a permanent solution to the problem. 
Robert Ago, in his presentation on the subject of necessity to the Interna-
tional Law Commission concluded that the Seal fisheries off the Russian 
Coast was a useful example because it not only illustrates the concept of 
necessity but introduces the strict conditions necessity required if in-
voked75. 
The defence of necessity is subject to seven conditions as enumerated 
by Yves Le Bouthillier : 
1. An essential interest of the state has to be in peril. 
2. The peril must be grave and imminent. 
3. The action taken by the state is the only one that could safeguard its essential 
interest. 
4. The action has not gravely prejudiced the interests of the state against which 
the action was directed. 
5. The action is temporary in nature. 
6. The action taken is limited to what is strictly necessary to face the peril. 
7. The state relying on necessity has not contributed to that necessity76. 
These seven conditions, based on Robert Ago's presentation to the 
International Law Commission, have also been summarized by Alan 
Beesley and Malcolm Rowe in their defence of the Canadian action which 
essentially repeats the Yves Le Bouthillier's enumeration77. 
Beesley and Rowe also argued that Canada's action can be justified 
under the doctrine of retorsion, as defined by Kelsen (1959) and elaborated 
by Miles and Burke (1988)78. Hans Kelsen, however, defined retorsion in his 
book Principles of International Law, as the following : 
75. R. AGO, « State of Necessity», in Yearbook of the International Law Commsssion 1980, 
New York, United Nations, 1981, p. 158. 
76. Y. L E BOUTHILLIER, «Can Canada Plead Necessity in Seizing the Spanish Trawler?» 
The Globe and Mail (March 16,1995) A-23. See also by Y. L E BOUTHILLIER, «L'affaire 
du turbot», Le Devoir (April 13, 1995) A-9. 
77. J.A. BEESLEY and M. R O W E , «Sound Basis in International Law for Canada's Action 
in the «Turbot War»» , (1995) 1 Canadian Internaiionll Lawyer 177-180. 
78. J.A. BEESLEY and M. R O W E , «Canada and Spain : A Conservation Dispute», in L.O.S. 
Lieder, Honolulu, Law of the Sea Institute, 1995, p. 3. 
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the conduct by which a state violates some interest of another state may not delict, 
that is to say, the state whose interest is violated may not be authorized to execute 
a sanction by taking an enforcement actionagainst the state which has violated its 
interest ; but it may react by a similar violation of an interest of the latter state. Such 
a reaction is called a retorsion. It is no sanction, for it is not an enforcement 
action — the employment of physical force in case of resistance not being permit-
ted19 [emphasis added]. 
Edward Miles and William Burke were precise that retorsion measures 
did not include physical force: «Nothing in the 1982 treaty or in other 
customary law, however, authorizes one high seas fishing state to take action 
on the high seas to enforce a conservation obligation owed to it by another 
state80. » Nevertheless, Miles and Burke concluded there were other re-
courses available : diplomatic action (protests), domestic remedies (refusal 
of port access), and international trade sanctions81. 
Retorsion was one of the four policy options suggested by Bob Apple-
baum. The Canadian government has employed diplomatic action (protests) 
and refusal of port access against EU and non-NAFO members fishing the 
NAFO Regulatory Area82. 
The three other options Applebaum suggested were : reprisals in con-
formity with international law83, dispute settlement84, and incorporation of 
provisions related to the coastal state's preferential rights over straddling 
stocks85. 
Applebaum's starting point for the third option, regarding the incorpo-
ration of provisions related to the coastal state's preferential rights over 
straddling stocks, involves an interpretation of options outlined by Miles 
and Burke. They concluded that according to UNCLOS, coastal states can 
79. H. KELSEN, Principles of International Law, New York, Rinehardt and Company Inc., 
1959, p. 25. 
80. E.L. MILES and W.T. BURKE, loc. cit., note 29,351. This work was presented to the Joint 
Soviet Maritime Law Association/Law of the Sea Institute Symposium on the Law of 
the Sea, Moscow, 28 November-2 December, 1988. 
81. Id., 351-352. 
82. B. APPLEBAUM, loc. cit., note 16, 17. 
83. B. APPLEBAUM loc. cit., note 16, 19, writes on the subject of reprisals : «under certain 
circumstances, a state which permits its nationals to fish straddling stocks outside the 
200 mile limit of a coastal state has violated the rights of that coastal state, and its own 
obligations under international law to that state, and has thus committed an international 
delict». Applebaum concludes the range of possible resprisal actions is very limited in 
practical terms because states try to minimize disruptions to their normal relations. 
84. B. APPLEBAUM loc. cit., note 16, 18, concludes that governments are reluctant to engage 
in compulsory dispute settlement for a number of reasons, including the heavy costs 
involved in personnel and money, and time required to obtains results. 
85. Id., 16. 
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prescribe measures for states fishing straddling stocks and demand that 
these states observe these measures and if refused, seek remedy through a 
compulsory dispute mechanism86. 
Applebaum extrapolates beyond Miles and Burke's conclusion which 
results in dispute settlement with the suggestion that the coastal state is to 
incorporate in its domestic legislation provisions relating to its preferential 
rights over straddling stocks outside its 200 mile limit : 
Such incorporation could provide for regulations applicable outside its 200 miles 
limit and for enforcement of these regulations outside 200 miles in, for example, 
cases where there are bilateral or multilateral agreements providing for such 
enforcement87. 
It should be considered it a leap in logic to go from dispute settlement 
suggested by Miles and Burke to unilateral enforcement measures against 
stateless vessels fishing on the high seas. It is an even greater extension of 
legal reasoning to consider these actions against other contracting parties of 
an international fishery organization such as NAFO. 
Some jurists may consider it legally justifiable to arrest so-called state-
less vessels because they are not registered under a « flag state » as « re-
quired » by UNCLOS Article 92 (1) : « Ships shall sail under the flag of State 
only ». This is an incorrect interpretation, according to the Legal Bureau of 
the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs which concluded the legisla-
tive history of Article 92 (1) does not indicate that the drafters of that 
provision and its precursors considered statelessness in and of itself to be 
contrary to international law88. 
Stateless vessels, therefore, should not be considered illegal under 
international law. This consideration, however, does not prevent any state 
from applying its domestic law to stateless vessels. Ted McDorman summa-
rized the elements of this legal argument and emphasized there were limi-
tations : 
Regarding a stateless vessel, prima facie, because a stateless vessel is not the 
territory of any State, there is no extraterritorial application of law. Since a State 
can prescribe and enforce laws against its own vessels on the high seas, it can also 
prescribe and enforce these laws against stateless vessels. But this is not to say that 
86. Ibid. See also E.L. MILES and T. BURKE, loc. cit.. note 29, 352. 
87. B. APPLEBAUM, loc. cit., note 16, 17. According to Applebaum, provisions for non-flag 
state enforcement on the high seas has already been made in at least one international 
fisheries management convention, the International Convention for the High Seas Fish-
eries of the North Pacific Ocean in force since 1953 (Article X). 
88. P. KIRSCH, loc. cit., note 71, 311. The memo continues:«If the numerous experts who 
conceived and refined UNCLOS over a period of some thirty years had considered the 
failure to sail under a flag to be repugnant to the history, goals or purposes of international 
law, they had every opportunity to say so in the clearest of terms. » 
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no limitations based on extraterritorial considerations exist as regards stateless 
vessels89. 
Professor Francis Rigaldies, a member of the Law Faculty of Univer-
sité de Montréal, considers the recent amendment to the Canadian Coastal 
Fisheries Act as a unjustified use of the concept of stateless persons (apa-
tride) in order to enforce fishing violations against stateless vessels : 
La Loi canadienne de 1994, qui autorise expressément la saisie et l'emploi de la 
force à rencontre du navire apatride, ne saurait donc être justifiée, même si son 
objectif était de lutter contre les navires sans nationalité. A contrario, le Canada 
n'est pas justifié à utiliser les règles du droit international relatives à apatride pour 
sanctionner les violations à ses règlements de pêche90. 
Rigaldies' reasoning relates to UNCLOS Article 110 which allows a 
ship to be boarded if there is reasonable grounds to believe the ship is 
without nationality (stateless). Article 92.2 considers vessels which sail 
under flags of convenience to be without nationality, and therefore, may also 
be boarded. Despite these powers to board and even to arrest, Rigaldies 
contends there is no power to seize or confiscate the vessel nor to take 
sanctions against the captain and crew91. 
Rigaldies also believes there is difficulty in establishing that a vessel is 
stateless. Article 91.1 of the 1982 treaty requires a « genuine link », however, 
the efforts to have stricter requirements for vessel registration such as the 
1993 FAO Compliance Agreement are considered a failure92. 
89. T.L. MCDORMAN, loc. cit., note 72, 543. States are not explicitly permitted under 
UNCLOS to enact or enforce laws regrding fishing activities by foreign vessels on the 
high seas except for anadromous species such as salmon. 
90. F. RIGALDIES, «La nouvelle Loi canadienne ou l'unilatéralisme retrouvé», Espaces et 
ressources maritimes, n° 8, 1994, p. 265. 
91. Id., 264-265. It is the context of Article 92.2 that Rigaldies discusses the The Lotus Case, 
France c. Turkey, (1927) 10 PCIJ Reports, Series A. It is useful to examine because it 
deals with the «effects doctrine» being superceded by customary law as outlined in 
Ariele 92.2. The Court concluded : « If therefore, a guilty act committed on the high seas 
produces its effects on a vessel flying another flag or in a foreign territory, the same 
principles must be applied as if the territories of two different States were concerned, 
and the conclusion must therefore be drawn that there is no rule of international law 
prohibiting the State to which the ship on which the effects of the offence have taken 
place belongs, from regarding the offence as having been committed in its territory and 
prosecuting accordingly, the delinquent. This conclusion could only be overcome if it 
were shown that there was rule of customary international law which, going further than 
the principle stated above established the exclusive jurisdiction of the State whose flag 
was flown » In 1927 the French goverment was unable to prove to the court the existence 
of such a rule of cu'stomary international law 
92. Id., 265-266. The Compliance Agreement requires contracting parties to ensure that 
vessels flying their flags do not engage in any activity that undermines the effectiveness 
of conservation. Many observers believe that the Agreement is weak and ineffective. 
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Rigaldies attacks the concept of self-defence which he considers to rely 
on the theory of necessity. In his opinion, the concept of self-defence is 
supported only by certain « anglo-saxon » authors. Rigaldies rejects self-
defence because it is related to the « effects » doctrine which would autho-
rize a state to rule on infractions committed outside its territory but that 
have an injurious effect with the state's territory93. 
Professor David VanderZwaag, of Dalhousie University Law Faculty, 
examined the « objective territoriality » or « effects principle » as a justifica-
tion for the extension of enforcement measures by a coastal state which 
would include powers of arrest and prosecution of vessels fishing straddling 
stocks94. 
VanderZwaag applied the « effects » principle to the straddling stock 
problem with the following rationale : 
[...] that the conduct of foreign fishing on the high seas is having an effect on fish 
stocks within the national 200 nautical mile fishing zone or economic zone and on 
dependant coastal communities. Assuming that the 1982 Law of the Sea Conven-
tion grants coastal states the right unilaterally to make laws applicable to straddling 
stocks on the high seas where international negotiation fails, the « effects » princi-
ple would be a basis for applying national enforcement power to the adjacent high 
seas area as well95. 
VanderZwaag admitted that the « effects » principle is not a sure foun-
dation for extending enforcement jurisdiction over foreign fishing vessels 
on the high seas. He conceded, that even outside of the UNCLOS context, 
application has been controversial. Interestingly, Canada has not favoured 
the detrimental effects principle alone but has « intertwined » the approach 
with the nationality and protective principles96. 
93. Id., 271. Rigaldies quotes J.M. ARBOUR, Droit international public, 2nd ed., Cowansville, 
Éditions Yvon Biais, 1992, pp. 236-237 : « L'autoprotection n'est pas sans rapport avec 
la doctrine dite «de l'effet», qui «autorise un Etat à juger des infractions commises à 
l'étranger, mais dont l'effet préjudiciable se fait sentir dans cet État. » » 
94. D. VANDERZWAAG, loc, cit., note 33, 133. VanderZwaag presents a second foundation 
for this option — the «effective administration of justice» doctrine (p. 135): «The 
doctrine, closely related to the « effects » principle, has been viewed as the underlying 
rationale for the right of hot pursuit [...] However, even if the validity of such a legal 
principle is accepted, a coastal state again faces the difficult question of the legal status 
of Article 92» [of UNCLOS]. Article 92 requires : «Ships shall sail under the flag of one 
State only and [...] shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.» 
95. Id., 132. 
96. H. KINDRED et al, International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 
4th ed., Toronto, Edmond Montgomery, 1987, pp. 468-470. Kindred defines these prin-
ciples : 
«Nationality Principle: The nationality of the offender is accepted as the basis of 
jurisdiction and is utilized extensively by civil law countries. Common law countries [...] 
have been reticent in their use of the nationality principle» (p. 469). 
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Ted McDorman commented on VanderZwaag's «effects» princi-
ple and concluded it had been superseded by the provisions of the 1982 
UNCLOS as well as its 1958 predecessors which explicitly permitted the 
freedom of fishing on the high seas and recognized the exclusive jurisdiction 
of flag states on the high seas: 
It is my opinion that the international law of the sea exists as a complete code 
regarding high seas fishing activities, such that State jurisdiction has to be based on 
the foundation of the law of the sea rather than the more general foundation of the 
« effects » or protective doctrine97. 
4.2 Conclusion 
When you're weak on facts, argue the law. 
When you're weak on the law, argue the facts. 
When you 're weak on both the law and the facts, you 
attack the prosecution. 
Old adage 
The « necessity » principle is no longer applicable at the present time 
because of the development of international law. There are at least two past 
examples where necessity was used and later confirmed by international law 
recognition. In 1967, the United Kingdom relied on the necessity principle 
when it bombed a Liberian oil tanker Torrey Canyon in international law 
waters to prevent further pollution of the British coast. This action was 
taken after the British Government had failed to disperse the oil by using 
detergents on the surface of the sea. An attempt was made to salvage the 
vessel, however, the hull broke and more oil was released. The bombing was 
successful because it ignited and burned off the oil before it could spread. 
There are several elements that should be remembered with the Torrey 
Canyon incident : the British authorities did not claim any legal justification 
for the bombing of the ship and in public statements, it emphasized the 
danger was extreme and the decision to bomb was made only after all other 
methods had failed. It was generally accepted a state of necessity existed 
because the flag state nor the shipowner protested the action98. 
« Protective Principle : Under this principle a state may exercise jurisdiction over acts 
committed abroad which are prejudicial to its security, territorial integrity and political 
independence» (p. 470). 
« Objective Territorial [Effects] Principle : [...] provides that the state where the act is 
consummated or where the last constituent element occurs or effects are felt takes 
jurisdiction over the offence» (p. 468). 
97. T.L. MCDORMAN, loc. cit., note 72, 545. 
98. P. KIRSCH, loc. cit., note 71, 313. 
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The International Law Commission commented on the « Torrey Can-
yon » incident and concluded a state of necessity can be invoked as a basis 
for state conduct not in conformity with international obligations : 
[...] where such conduct proves necessary, by way of exception, in order to avert a 
serious and imminent danger which, even if not inevitable, is nevertheless a threat 
to a vital ecological interest, whether such conduct is adopted on the high seas, in 
outer space or—even this is not ruled out — in an area subject to the sovereignty 
of another state". 
The actions taken during the «Torrey Canyon » incident received 
further recognition in UNCLOS Article 221 : 
Nothing [...] shall prejudice the right of States, pursuant to international law, both 
conventional and customary, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial 
sea proportionate to the actual orthreatened damage to protect their coastline or 
related interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following 
upon a maritime casualty. 
A second recent example where the doctrine of necessity was used and 
later recognized was Canada's Arciic Waters Pollution Prevention Act100. 
Enacted in 1970, the legislation established a pollution prevention zone to a 
distance 100 miles from the coast of Canada. It enabled Canada to protect 
the Arctic marine environment without recourse to full-scale claim to sov-
ereignty over the waters'01. Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau explained their 
legal justification regarding the Arciic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in 
their book The Canadian Way : Shaping Canadass Foreign Policy : 
We would emphasize we were not acting in breach of international law, rather, in 
the special Arctic circumstances, we were acting on behalf of the international 
community in the absence of applicable law102. 
Ultimately, the Canadian initiatives were recognized and largely ac-
cepted by the international community. The 1973 Law of Sea Conference 
accepted the Canadian concept of Arctic environmental protection and later 
included an article regarding ice-covered areas, Article 234, in the 1982 Law 
of the Sea treaty. 
99. Ibid. 
100. Artie Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 2. 
101. D.M. MCRAE, «Arctic Waters and Canadian Sovereignty», International Journal, 
Vol. 38, No. 3, Summer 1983, p. 478. 
102. I. HEAD and P. TRUDEAU, The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada's Foreign Policy, 
1968-1984, Toronto, McClelland dnd dtewart, ,995, p. 39. It should db remembered dhat 
Canada deposited a reservation to Canadian acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice (it was withdrawn in 1985). A similar reservation 
was also made after the 1994 amendment to the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, supra, 
note 3. 
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There are some critics who believe these unilateral attempts at func-
tional jurisdiction are part of a larger diplomatic effort to set the agenda in 
multilateral forums. They consider the 1994 amendment to Coastal Fisher-
ies Protection Act and the arrest of the Kristina Logos as a manœuvre to 
further the Canadian agenda at the United Nations Conference on Strad-
dling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks : 
[...] la loi canadienne semble avoir pour double fonction d'encourager l'accélération 
des travaux de la Conférence sur les stocks chevauchants en même temps qu'elle 
marque la détermination du Canada à contrecarrer la surpêche étrangère au large de 
ses côtes103. 
There are also some observers who believe that the arrest of the Estai 
was part of a Canadian negotiating strategy at the United Nations Con-
ference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Cana-
dian Fisheries Minister Brian Tobin said Canada's seizure of the Spanish 
vessel convinced the EU countries that they should accept the final draft of 
the convention104. 
Distinctions should be made between the application of enforcement 
measures against vessels flying flags of convenience and vessels that are 
under the responsibility of flag states such as Spain and Portugal. An argu-
ment can be made regarding the arrest of flag of convenience vessels which 
sail under the flag of more than one state in contravention of UNCLOS 
Article 92.1. 
It is a very different argument to seize the vessels of another flag state 
such as Spain and Portugal. Even if the Canadian government could con-
vince the international community that the seven conditions of necessity 
were present in the arrest of the Estai, it would have to convince them that 
the defence of necessity allows the use of force. 
Yves Le Bouthillier observed that the International Law Commission 
was unable to resolve this issue and the United Nations Charter would 
therefore apply : 
According to many people^the UN Charter allows resort to force in only two cases : 
self-defence, and actions under the authority of the Security Council. Even if we 
concede for argument's sake that necessity constitutes another exception permit-
ting force, a state would have a hard time establishing that force was the only means 
open to it, given the clear obligation of states to resolve their disputes peacefully105. 
103. J.-L. PRAT, «La loi canadienne du 12 mai 1994 sur la protection des pêches côtières» 
ou «L'unilatéralisme canadien réactivé», Espaces et ressources maritimes, n° 8, 1994, 
p. 277. 
104. D. WESTELL, «High-seas Police Get UN Clout», Globe and Mail (August 4, 1995) 1. 
105. Y. LE BOUTHILLIER, loc. cit., note 76, A-29. 
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The obligation of states to resolve disputes peacefully could be consid-
ered analogous to the third condition of necessity — « the action taken by 
the state is only one that could safeguard its essential interest. » There 
remains some doubt that all avenues of negotiation and dispute settlement 
were considered before the arrest of the Spanish vessel. 
Despite the precedents of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
and the Torrey Canyon incident there seems to be a clear distinction be-
tween the arrest of foreign nationals on the high seas and the introduction 
of standards for tanker traffic in the Arctic or the destruction of a vessel and 
its potentially dangerous cargo after the failure of a salvage attempt. This 
distinction will never be decided upon by the International Court of Justice, 
because when Canada amended the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act it 
made a reservation regarding its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice106. 
Furthermore, there remains the question whether Canada, the state 
relying on doctrine of necessity, has not contributed to that state of neces-
sity. Yves Le Bouthillier remarked that «[t]he ILC [International Law 
Commission] seems to say that all contributions of a state, whether inten-
tional or negligent, to a situation of necessity prevent it from invoking that 
defence107. » 
It could be argued that Canada contributed to creating a state of 
necessity by provoking a vote on the NAFO allocation that it knew would 
not be acceptable to the EU during the February 1, 1995, NAFO meeting in 
Brussels. Moreover, the EU asked the Chairman for the exceptional mea-
sure of having a vote on whether to vote on the allocations. A narrow vote, 
6 to 5 with two abstentions, decided the quotas. Finally, it should be 
emphasized, the Canadian Fisheries Minister insisted on the term « transi-
tional measures » which the EU considered would be equivalent to tacit 
acceptance of the Brussels meeting's allocations which would be used as an 
« allocation key » in the determination of future quotas108. 
106. Currently, Spain is challenging the legality of the Canadian reservation to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. 
107. Y. LE BOUTHILLIER, loc. cit., note 76, A-29. 
108. Interview with F. KINGSTON, supra, note 53 ; NAFO, op. cit., note 51, pp. 14-16. It could 
also be argued that Canada contributed to a state of necessity because of its own fishing 
activities within the 200-mile zone. 
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5. The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
5.1 The Road to the Rio Summit 
There's a riddle now that might baffle all the lawyers 
backed by the ghosts of the whole line of judges: 
— like a hawk's beak it pecks my brain. 
I'll, I'll solve it though ! 
Captain Ahab, in Moby Dick. 
In 1990, Canada launched what it called the « legal initiative » to combat 
Canadian frustration with the existing UNCLOS framework. The initiative 
involved consultation with like-minded countries, the publication of legal 
and scientific articles, and the organization of conferences'09. In September, 
1990, a conference was held in St.John's, Newfoundland, regarding the 
conservation and management of biological resources on the high seas. 
Legal and scientific experts from 16 countries discussed the problem of 
straddling stocks in the context of the Law of the Sea110. 
The experts agreed on four principles : 1) distant water fishing states 
should cooperate with coastal states ; 2) members of regional fishing orga-
nizations have the duty to ensure their vessels respect conservation measu-
res and do not « reflag » ; 3) distant water fishing states should ensure their 
fishing activities do not endanger stocks within the coastal state's compe-
tence ; and 4) the « consistency rule » : the management regime for high seas 
straddling stocks should be coordinated with measures adopted for stocks 
within the coastal states EEZs. The last two principles were not adopted 
unanimously because it raised the controversial issue of coastal state sov-
ereignty over the management of fish stocks within the EEZ ' ' '. 
The next instrumental conference was in Santiago, Chile, in May, 1991. 
Experts from Canada, Chile, and New Zealand recommended a series of 
measures that were inspired by the conclusions of the St.John's conference. 
This became known as the Santiago text, which emphasized the coastal 
state's special interest, coordination of conservation measures between the 
high seas fishing states and coastal states, and protection from the negative 
impact caused by high seas fishing activities on resources within the EEZ" 2 . 
109. P. F A U T E U X , «Liinitiative juridique canadienne sur la pêche en haute mer», in The 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law, vol. 31, Vancouver, U.B.C. Press, 1993, p. 56. 
110. These countries included Argentina, Australia, Cape Verde, Chile, the Cook Islands, 
Iceland, Mauritius, Morocco, New Zealand, Peru, Senegal, the United States, Uruguay 
and the former USSR. 
111. P. F A U T E U X , loc. cit., note 109, 55. 
112. Id., 56. 
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The Santiago text influenced a proposal presented by 13 states, which 
included Canada, three months later, during the third session of the Prep-
Com for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED)"3. The PrepComs were involved in the preparations for 
UNCED, otherwise known as « The Earth Summit », planned for June 1992 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The 1991 Proposal of 13 states emphasized the 
conservation problems caused by the lack of effective implementation of 
UNCLOS Articles 63 (2), 116 and 117. They proposed nine measures which 
included the «consistency rule114». 
In March to April, 1992, during the fourth and final session of the 
UNCED PrepCom, the 13 states werejoined by 27 developing countries and 
resubmitted a revised version of the 13 state proposal which also empha-
sized the consistency principle115. These 40 states co-sponsored document 
that became known as L.16116. 
The Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks was obtained as compromise by these 40 countries for the exclusion 
of L.16 from the oceans chapter of Agenda 21 during Earth Summit in Rio 
(UNCED) in June, 1992. Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 required that the confer-
ence should be organized : 
with a view to promoting effective implementation of the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks1'7. 
On the basis on the UNCED recommendation, the 47th session of the 
UN General Assembly adopted, December 22, 1992, resolution 47/192 
which officially convened the conference118. 
113. Conservation and Management of Living Resources of the High Seas-Principles and 
Measures for an Effective Regime Based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/PC/WG.II/L. 16 (August 15,1991). The thirteen countries included 
Argentina, Barbados, Canada, Chile, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland, Kiribati, New 
Zealand, Peru, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. P. FAUTEUX, loc. cit., note 109, 
57, refers to «dix-sept États côtiers» [17 coastal states], however, he only lists thirteen 
countries. 
114. B. KWIATKOWSKA, loc. cit., note 26, 347. 
115. Id.,349. 
116. UN Doc. A/CONF. 15 l/PC/WGII/L.16/Rev.l (March 16, 1992). 
117. UNITED NATIONS, Agenda 21 : Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, 
Conference on Environment and Development, New York, UN Dept. of Public Infor-
mation, 1993, p. 155. 
118. According to P. FAUTEUX, loc. cit., note 109,67, the adoption of the resolution was only 
achieved after months of difficult negotiations because of the positions taken by EU 
regarding the mandate and duration of the Conference. The EU attempted to enlarge the 
mandate of the Conference to include management of fish stocks within the EEZ. 
Regarding duration, the EU did not want the Conference to extend beyond 1993. 
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5.2 The Organizational Session : April 1993 
The organizational session for the United Nations Conference on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was held at the 
UN headquarters in New York, April 19-23, 1993 " 9 . Ambassador Satya N. 
Nandan (Fiji), the former U N Under-Secretary-General and Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General for the Law of the Sea, was elected 
Chairman of the conference. The Chairman was requested to draft a docu-
ment to address the issues to be discussed and to call for submissions from 
delegates. 
5.3 The First Substantive Session : July 12-30,1993 
The first substantive session of the UN Conference on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was opened by Chairman Nandan, 
July 12, 1993, in New York. The Chairman's Guide (A/CONF.164/10) was 
presented and it outlined several issues that later became part of the draft 
negotiating text (A/CONF.164/13*) at the conclusion of the first substantive 
session. 
A so-called « Core Group », composed of Canada, Chile, Iceland, Ar-
gentina, and New Zealand, represented coastal states' interests by submit-
ting a « Draft Convention on the Conservation and Management of Strad-
dling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks on the High Seas120». 
The first substantive session was significant because two divergent 
positions became clear : coastal states' rights and the interests of distant 
water fishing nations. Perhaps the most controversial issue was that of the 
management of a fish stock as one biological mass versus the division of a 
fish stock along political/territorial boundaries. This raised the issue of 
sovereignty, the EEZs of coastal states and the question of interference in 
the domestic management of fish stocks by distant water fishing nations. 
119. Two other conferences on high seas fishing recommended a more effective implemen-
tation the straddling stocks provisions of UNCLOS : the FAO Technical Consultations 
on High Seas Fishing, held September 1992 in Rome, and the International Conference 
on Responsible Fishing held May 1992 in Cancun which was convened by Mexico in 
concultation with FAO. The conference in Cancun recommended, among other princi-
ples, that « States should take effective action, consistent with international law, to deter 
reflagging of vessels as a means of avoiding compliance with applicable conservation 
and management rules for fishing activities on the high seas. » (Declaration of Cancun, 
p. 4, Article 13.) 
120. UN DOC. A/CONF.164/L.11, later revised as UN Doc. A/CONF.164/L.ll/Rev.l. 
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Some coastal states argued that any reference to EEZs should be eliminated 
from the negotiating text121. 
A second controversial issue was discussed regarding flag state respon-
sibilities for vessels on the high seas as well as those of coastal states, port 
states, and regional organizations. As the result of the debate on flagging or 
reflagging fishing vessels a consensus document was produced under the 
framework of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) : the « Agree-
ment to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Manage-
ment Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas122 ». 
A third issue was the precautionary approach debate. The EU, Japan, 
and Korea argued that the precautionary approach is taken directly from the 
Rio Declaration's Principle, which applies to pollution, and does not apply 
to fisheries management123. 
5.4 The Second Substantive Session : March 1994 
The second substantive was held in New York, March 14-31,1994. This 
session consisted primarily of reviewing and revising the negotiating in 
informal sessions. Interestingly, some « Core Group » coastal states (which 
expanded during the third session to include Peru and Norway) proposed to 
adopted unilateral measures to control high seas fishing if agreement could 
not be reached regarding an acceptable regime124. 
Canadian Fisheries Minister Brian Tobin outlined four objectives that 
a new convention should recognize : the need for a precautionary approach, 
binding and compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms, compliance re-
garding conservation measures, and the special interests of coastal states. 
The response from Japan was that the present process should not include 
any new concepts or rights that go beyond the provisions of UNCLOS. 
Japan was not in favour of the precautionary approach because it could lead 
121. E. MELTZER, «Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks : The 
Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries», (1994) 25 Ocean Development and 
International Law 26. 
122. Ibid. The Agreement was adopted in 1993 and will enter into force with the 25th 
instrument of acceptance (agreement distributed at the third session of the conference 
in March 1994). The FAO also began to draft an International Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fishing. 
123. P. CHASEK, « Summary of the Resumed Prepcom for the Conference on the Sustainable 
Development of Small Island developing States, 7-11 March 1994 », Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, July 12, 1993, p. 1. Other countries, which included Australia, Norway, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Iceland, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Trinidad and Tobago, 
the Solomon Islands and the United States, argued that the precautionary approach as 
outlined in the Rio Declaration was relevant in all fields of natural resource management. 
124. E. MELTZER, loc. cit., note 121, 327. 
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to moratoria, and consequently limit the efforts of the Japanese long-
distance fleet125. 
The United States supported the ecosystem approach to maintain 
associated species, the precautionary approach, the need for regional coop-
eration, and assistance to the developing countries. Interestingly, the EU 
representative emphasized the importance of regional fisheries organiza-
tions and that the multilateral approach is irreplaceable. The EU interest in 
the preserving the multilateral status quo could have been their reluctance 
to be bound by an international convention whereas, currently, in NAFO 
they have the option of invoking the objection procedure126. 
Informal sessions were held during the first week which discussed the 
question of coastal state sovereignty versus the freedom to fish on the high 
seas. The resulting debate involved the distant water states which argued for 
the biological unity of fish stocks whereas coastal states regarded this 
concept as intrusion on their sovereign rights and invasion of their EEZs127. 
5.5 The Third Substantive Session : August 15-26,1994 
After the Chairman's opening remarks, informal sessions were con-
vened to discuss the Revised Negotiation Text (A/CONF.164/13/Rev.l). 
After some discussion, the Chairman produced a new draft of the negotiating 
text, which was in the form of a legally-binding draft agreement (the « Draft 
Agreement»)128. At the end of the second week of negotiations the Draft 
Agreement was again revised into the Chair's Draft Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and 
125. L. CLIFTON, «Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Conference 
Highlights, Monday, 14 March 1994», Earth Negotiations Bulletin, March 15, 1994, 
p. 1. 
126. Id., 1-2. 
127. Id., 2. 
128. The legally binding issue was controversial because the mandate given to the Conference 
by the General Assembly was only to formulate «appropriate recommendations». 
Several coastal states, including Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, Norway 
and Peru emphasized their interest in a legally binding instrument. The high seas fishing 
nations, such as the EU, Japan, and Poland, preferred non-binding guidelines. The U.S. 
expressed a desire for a non-binding instrument. M. HAYASHI, «United Nations Con-
ference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks : An Analysis of 
the 1993 Sessions », in Oceans Yearbook 11, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994, 
p. 34. 
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Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
(A/CONF.164/22)129. 
This new draft agreement included a 31-page revised negotiating text 
with 47 articles in thirteen parts. Chairman Nandan stated that with further 
improvements the draft agreement would respond to the concerns of the Rio 
Declaration and Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 because it included several impor-
tant proposals. First, there were several effective mechanisms suggested for 
compliance and enforcement of those measures on the high seas. Second, it 
provided for a globally-agreed framework for regional cooperation in fish-
eries conservation. Third, it recognized the need for the settlement of 
disputes relating to fisheries matters through compulsory binding dispute 
settlement130. 
5.6 The Fourth Substantive Session : March 27-April 12,1995 
The fourth substantive session was marked by the Canadian arrest of 
the Spanish fishing vessel Estai on March 9, 1995. Canadian Fisheries 
Minister Brian Tobin emphasized the need for five objectives to be 
achieved : a legally binding UN Convention ; the implementation of a pre-
cautionary approach ; compatibility between conservation measures inside 
and outside 200 miles ; binding and compulsory dispute settlement resolu-
tion measures ; and high seas enforcement13'. 
There remained two contentious articles : Article 14 dealing with high 
sea enclaves and Article 21 regarding compliance and enforcement. There 
were two intersessional meetings : a June meeting in Washington and « pre-
session» consultation in New York from 19-21 July, 1995. At the Washing-
ton meeting, hosted by the American government, various coastal state and 
distant water countries, including Argentina, Canada, the European Union, 
Japan, Korea, and Korea, discussed the compliance and enforcement issue 
under Article 21. The New York « pre-session » consultations held at UN 
Headquarters was attended by approximately 20 delegations. The discus-
sion focused on the circulation of a « non-paper » prepared by the American 
delegation. The European Union and Japan presented two alternative texts. 
129. L. CLIFTON, « Summary of the Third Session of the UN Conference on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 15-26 August 1994», Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, August 29, 1994, p. 8. 
130. Id., 11. 
131. L. CLIFTON, «Fish Conference Highlights, 27-31 March 1995», Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, April 3, 1995, p. 3. 
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The American non-paper became to be considered a « catalyst in attempting 
to seek a middle ground position'32 ». 
In conclusion, despite the inter-sessional discussions there remained 
difficulty in the final wording of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Chairman's 
Draft Agreement which continued into the fifth and final substantive ses-
sion. 
5.7 The Successful Conclusion : The Fifth Substantive Session 
The ultimate success of the negotiations culminated in a final text of the 
Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. On 
August 4, 1995, Chairman Nandan outlined three essential « pillars » of the 
Agreement. The first pillar requires management be based on the precaution-
ary approach. The second pillar ensures that the primary enforcement re-
sponsibility of the flag State is reaffirmed and the framework for action by 
States other than the flag States is set out with clear safeguards against 
abuse. The third pillar provides for the possibility of non-binding settlement, 
nevertheless, every dispute can be submitted to a tribunal for a binding 
decision133. 
5.7.1 Pillar I : Conservation Measures 
5.7.1.1 The Precautionary Approach 
Article 5 (b) reemphasizes the principle that measures are based on the 
best scientific evidence available to determine the level of maximum sustain-
able yield (MSY) which is already contained in UNCLOS Article 119. 
Article 5 (c) mentions the application of the precautionary in accordance 
with Article 6. 
It is important to remember when UNCLOS was adopted there was no 
precautionary approach included. Moritaka Hayashi, Director of the United 
Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, believes that the 
precautionary approach principle was developed since the mid-1980s in 
132. C. CARPENTER, «A Brief History of the Conference», Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
July 24, 1995, p. 2. 
133. S.N. NANDAN, Closing Statement, United Nations, Sixth Session August 4, 1995, p. 2. 
M. COLLETT, «Achieving Effective International Fishery Management: A Critical 
Analysis of the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks »,(1995) 4 Dal. J. Leg. Stud. 11 
defined the precautionary approach as including two notions : (i) that environmental 
control measures should not depend on or wait for scientific certainty of cause-effect 
link; and (ii) the presumption that it is better to err in decision-making on the side of 
caution. 
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domestic and regional legal instruments for the protection of the terrestrial 
and subsequently marine environment134. 
Therefore, Article 6.2 is significant because «States shall be more 
cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The ab-
sence of adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures135» 
(emphasis added). 
Article 6.3 (b) and Annex II establish the guidelines to determine the 
precautionary approach reference points. The guidelines recommend the 
use of two types of « precautionary » reference points : conservation (or 
limit) reference points and management (or target) reference points. Conser-
vation reference points set boundaries which are intended to constrain 
harvesting within safe biological limits within which the stocks can produce 
maximum sustainable yield, while management reference points are in-
tended to meet management objectives. Article 6.4 requires that when 
reference points are approached they will not be exceeded and in the event 
that they are exceeded, States shall take action immediately. These refer-
ence points would seem to clarify the «F.O.I » versus «Fmax» debate 
within the NAFO organization136. 
5.7.1.2 Compatibility between Conservation Measures 
The Agreement is also significant because it attempts to resolve the 
issue of compatibility of conservation and management measures adopted 
for areas under national coastal state jurisdiction and those adopted for the 
high seas. Article 7 provisions are more specific than UNCLOS Article 63 
(2) which requires coastal and high seas states fishing straddling stocks to 
« seek to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of the 
stock137». 
Moritaka Hayashi considered compatibility a difficult issue during the 
negotiations for the Agreement and « at the heart » of the issue was the 
134. M. HAYASHI, «The 1995 Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks : Significance For the Law of the Sea Convention », in Ocean Yearbook 12, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 5. 
135. The general rules are outlined in Article 6 and the specific applications are outlined in 
« Guidelines for the application of precautionary reference points in conservation and 
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks » which is con-
tained in Annex II to the Agreement. 
136. M. COLLETT, loc. cit., note 133, 19. F.o.l is considered the more precautionary approach. 
137. NAFO's Article XI (3) (a) requires the NAFO Commission to seek «to ensure consis-
tency » between any measure that applies to a stock occurring both with the Regulatory 
Area and within an area under the fisheries jurisdiction of a coastal state. 
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coastal state argument that it had a special interest or preferential rights138. 
There were some coastal states that claimed their supremacy over foreign 
fleets on the adjacent high seas, that in the case of conflict, the coastal states 
rights would be superior139. In fact, the Core Group Draft Convention (also 
known as Five-Power Draft Convention) presented by the delegations of 
Argentina, Canada, Chile, Iceland and New Zealand proposed that the 
Agreement should « [r]ecognize and give effect to the special interest of 
coastal states in straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks 
occurring both in their exclusive economic zones and on the high seas140. » 
There are some observers who believe that the new Agreement recog-
nizes the coastal states' contention that in determining conservation mea-
sures for straddling stocks the coastal state should have a superior position. 
There may be some misplaced justification for this because of Article 7.2 (a) 
requires that states shall : 
take into account the conservation and management measures adopted and applied 
in accordance with article 61 of the Convention in respect of the same stocks by 
coastal states within areas under national jurisdiction and ensure that measures 
established in respect of such stocks for the high seas do not undermine the 
effectiveness of such measures'41 . 
The theory of coastal state superiority could be challenged, however, by 
the curious juxtaposition of Article 7.2 (a) vis-à-vis Articles 7.2 (d) and 
7.2 (e). Article 7.2 (d) takes into account biological unity including the extent 
to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national jurisdiction. 
Article 7.2 (e) takes into account the « respective dependence » of the coastal 
States and the States fishing on the high seas of the stocks concerned. 
5.7.2 Pillar II : Effective Enforcement 
5.7.2.1 Regional Fisheries Organizations 
As mentioned in preceding pages, UNCLOS Article 63 (2) only required 
states to « seek to agree » for compatibilitay and NAFO sought to have 
« consistency » of conservation measures. Article 118 of UNCLOS required 
that « States shall co-operate with each other in the conservation and man-
agement of living resources in the areas of the high seas [...] [and] co-operate 
to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations. » 
138. M. HAYASHI, loc. cit., note 128, 42. 
139. Ibid. 
140. UN Doc. A/CONF.164/L.11/Rev.l, supra, article 4 (a) (iii). 
141. UN Doc. A/CONF.164/33, article 7.2 (a); Article 7.1 affirms that compatibility will be 
without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the coastal states. 
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Article 8.3 directly strengthens the role of regional fisheries organiza-
tions. Article 8.3 requires states fishing for stocks on the high sea and 
concerned coastal States : 
shall give effect to their duty to cooperate by becoming a member of such orga-
nization [...] or by agreeing to apply the conservation and management measures 
established by such an organization. 
There can be no doubt in the obligatory nature of regional fishery 
organization according to the requirements of Article 8.4 : «Only those 
States which are members of such an organization [...] or which agree to 
apply the conservation and management measures establish by such an 
organization [...] shall have access to the fishery resource to which those 
measures apply. » 
5.7.2.2 Duties of Flag States 
The Agreement has a number of obligations that the flag state must 
agree to before its vessels are allowed to fish in a regulatory area. Hitherto, 
UNCLOS Article 117 only required in a general manner : «All states have 
the duty to take, or cooperate with other States in taking, such measures for 
their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the 
living resources of the high seas. » 
The new Agreement emphasizes the effective control of vessels from 
the flag state by various requirements as listed under 18 (3): control by 
means of fishing licenses that are in accordance with the flag state obliga-
tions to the regional fishing organization, the establishment of a national 
record of authorized fishing vessels, and timely reporting of vessel position 
and fish catches. 
Also included in Article 18 provisions are measures for monitoring and 
surveillance, such as the implementation of observer programs and satellite 
surveillance, which were part of the recent bilateral agreement between 
Canada and the European Union (later extended to all NAFO members). 
Articles 19 and 20 require compliance and enforcement measures by the flag 
state. 
5.7.2.3 Port State Jurisdiction 
UNCLOS Article 218 empowers Port States to undertake investiga-
tions and where evidence so warrants, institute proceedings if the vessel is 
voluntarily within a port. Article of 23 (2) of the Agreement allows the port 
state to inspect documents, fishing gear, and catch on board the vessel. 
Article 23 (3) gives new powers to port states «to prohibit landings and 
transhipments where it has been established that the catch has been taken 
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in a manner which undermines the effectiveness of subregional, regional or 
global conservation and management measures on the high seas. » 
5.7.2.4 Cooperation in Effective Enforcement 
Article 21 was considered the most contentious issue during the six 
sessions142. The issue was largely resolved during an informal meeting 
hosted by the Americans between the fourth and fifth substantive sessions. 
Article 21(1) gives a state which is a member of the regional organization the 
right to board and inspect vessels flying the flag of another state party 
whether or such a state party is not a member of the regional organization. 
The only caveat, however, is that both state parties must be signatories of 
the new Agreement. 
Article 21 (2) makes the adoption obligatory of boarding and inspection 
measures as outlined in Article 21 (1). Article 21 (2) requires that if within 
two years of the adoption of the Agreement, any regional organization has 
not adopted such boarding and inspection measures, any future enforcement 
procedures will be based on those outlined in Article 21 and 22. 
Article 21 (5) is an aggressive approach to non-enforcement by flag 
states : it gives the flag state three days (72 hours) following boarding and 
inspection to respond to notification, investigate, and to take enforcement 
measures if necessary. If the flag state does not respond within the delay the 
inspecting state is empowered to inspect and take enforcement measures. If 
there are clear grounds to believe there has been a «serious violation», 
Article 21 (7) allows the inspecting state to bring the vessel to the nearest 
port. In reference to these new provisions, Canadian Fisheries Minister 
Brian Tobin announced that « a clear right [has been] established for coastal 
states to take direct enforcement measures on the high seas beyond 
200 miles143». 
5.7.3 Pillar III: Dispute Settlement 
The provisions relating to the settlement of disputes set out in Part XV 
of UNCLOS apply mutatis mutandss to any dispute between parties 
142. The other contentious issue, Article 16 (formerly known as Article 14) regards high seas 
enclaves surrounded by an area under the national jurisdiction of single state. This is a 
rare situation particular to the Sea of Okhotsk and the Russian Federation sought special 
provisions. Various states involved in fisheries in area opposed these measures. Only 
after protracted negotiations was Article 16 accepted which required states to «pay 
special attention to establishment of compatible conservation and management measures 
for such stocks pursuant to article 7. » 
143. D. WESTELL, loc. cit., note 104, A-l, A-4. 
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whether or not the parties to the Agreement are also parties to UNCLOS 
(Article 30 (1)). Therefore, these provisions would apply to any dispute 
between state parties «concerning the interpretation or application of a 
subregional, regional or global fisheries agreement relating to straddling fish 
stocks or highly migratory fish stocks to which they are parties, including 
any dispute concerning the conservation and management of such stocks, » 
whether or not they are also parties to UNCLOS (Article 30 (2))144. 
A Canadian newspaper, The Globe and Mail, considers the new dispute 
settlement mechanism as a means of preventing unilateral quotas within 
NAFO: 
In the past, when NAFO assigned quotas, members who disagreed could opt out 
and set their own limits. Now quotas must be consistent with the policy set by the 
coastal state which shares the stock, and if one member tries to undermine that 
decision with its own quota, the dispute can be taken to an independent tribunal set 
up under the UN' s Convention on the Law of the Sea145. 
Conclusion 
Canada has a mytholog,, but it is only now, after 
about 400 years of history, being forced to decide 
what it is going to do about it 
Robertson DAVIES 
Canada has a certain international myth of multilateralism and quiet 
diplomacy to preserve. Are Canada's recent unilateral actions a betrayal of 
the multilateral tradition ? Some observers recall the aggressive unilateral 
Canadian action during the enactment of the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act. Other observers, such as Professor Ted McDorman, com-
mented that these memories are of alleged aggressive Canadian action to 
protect its Arctic interests in the 1970s147. 
Other commentators, such as Professor Michael M'Gonigle, ques-
tioned Canada's motives during the United Nations Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Conference. M'Gonigle observed: 
« Despite its conservationist posturing, no one is sure on whose side Canada 
144. M. HAYASHI, toc. cit., note 134, 5. 
145. D. WESTELL, loc. cit., note 104. 
146. R. DAVIES, «Signing Away Canada's Soul», Harperss Magazine, January 1989, p. 43. 
147. T.L. MCDORMAN, «Canada's Aggressive Fisheries Actions: Will They Improve the 
Climate for International Agreements ? », Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 2, No. 3, Winter 
1994, p. 7. He is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law at University Victoria. 
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will stand148. » The concern over Canada's position during the Conference 
related to its reluctance to embrace the « consistency rule ». 
The consistency rule is important to the application of the precaution-
ary approach of fisheries management. The rule requires that both coastal 
states and high seas fishing states abide by the same approach. Some coastal 
states, however, believe that the imposition of the consistency rule infringes 
upon their sovereignty. Canada was criticized because it was perceived to 
have diluted its support for the consistent application of the precautionary 
approach. Canada had not changed its position, however, it had become less 
vocal because another member of the so-called Core group, Chile, had 
reservations regarding the effects of the consistency rule to Chile's sover-
eignty149. 
To judge the success of the Canadian government's two-track strategy, 
the unilateral and multilateral approaches, a careful examination of the two 
resulting agreements is required. The major accomplishment of the Canada-
EU Bilateral Agreement (later made multilateral to apply to all NAFO 
members) was the establishment of the observer program with 100 % cover-
age on all NAFO member fishing vessels. The program does not apply to the 
non-NAFO member countries, stateless vessels, nor flag of convenience 
vessels150. 
The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly, 
Migratory Fish Stocks suggests the implementation of observer programs 
(Article 18). Furthermore, it has provisions that can apply to flag of conve-
nience vessels : Article 21(1) allows a contracting party to the Agreement, 
which is a member of a regional fisheries organization, the right to board and 
inspect fishing vessels of another contracting party even if such a party is 
not a membrr of the regional organization. 
The famous F.O.I and Fmax debate within NAFO still remained after 
the Canada-EU Bilateral Agreement. The UN Agreement has adopted the 
precautionary approach and requires that states apply it within both areas 
148. M. M'GONICLE and D. BABICKI, «The Turbot's Last Stand?» The Globe and Mail 
(July 21, 1995) A-19. Michael M'Gonigle is a professor of law at University of Victoria 
and Dominica Babicki is a graduate student at Simon Fraser University. 
149. Interview with A. DONOHUE, former Senior Policy Adviser to the Ambassador for 
Fisheries Conservation, Ottawa, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
November 16, 1995. 
150. The 100% observer program is considered a success: since it was implemented by 
Canada and the EU in May, Canadian inspectors have found only one violation by EU 
vessels compared to 19 during the same period last year. «Tobin Welcomes Tough 
Fisheries Enforcement Measures», News Release, September 15, 1995, NR-HQ-95-
108E. 
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of national jurisdiction and the high seas to straddling and highly migratory 
stocks (Articles 3 (1), 5 (c) and 6). 
The controversial NAFO objection procedure still remains a challenge 
to NAFO decisions. The UN Agreement's Article 30 (2) emphasizes the 
UNCLOS dispute settlement provisions can be applied by parties to the 
Agreement to disputes concerning the application and interpretation of a 
regional fisheries organization's agreement, to which they are members, 
whether or not these states are also parties to UNCLOS151. 
Canada has always been aware of the necessity of careful coordination 
between aggressive unilateral action and multilateral negotiation. Ted 
McDorman remarked that the dilemma was whether Canada's aggressive 
actions had improved the climate for international agreements152. The two-
track strategy is often compared to the strategy outlined during the 
enactment of the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. The strategy 
relies on the belief that existing international law can be developed by what 
may be considered unilateral and illegal action. 
McDorman believes the enactment of the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act is not a good analogy because Canada's aggression was 
alleged, in fact, no country's direct interests were challenged153. Many 
Canadians also seemed to have forgotten that while Canada continued to 
work on the drafting of regulations for the Arctic Waters Pollution Preven-
tion Act, it was also engaged in widespread consultation with interested 
countries154. 
Therefore, instead of trying to excuse Canadian unilateral action by 
justifications under UNCLOS or the concept of necessity, the Canadian 
government should have emphasized that it was acting in the development 
of international law in consultation with other countries. In 1970, Pierre 
Trudeau articulated these elements : 
We have told our friends and neighbours that the Canadian step, designed to 
protect Arctic waters, will not lead to anarchy ; it is not a step which diminishes the 
international rule of law ; it is not a step taken in disregard of the aspirations and 
interests of other members of the international community. Canadian action is 
instead an assertion of the importance of the environment155. 
151. The EU has given its intention to become a party to the UN Agreement pending EU 
internal procedures. 
152. T.L. MCDORMAN, loc. cit., note 147, 5. 
153. Id,, 27. 
154. P. TRUDEAU and I. H E A D , op. cit,, note 102, p. 62. 
155. Id,, p. 64. 
